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From “Arbitrary” to Arbitration: Using
ADR’s Popular Favorite to Resolve
Commercial Marijuana Disputes
Madeline G. Landry*
INTRODUCTION
Arizona entrepreneurs Michele Hammer and Mike Haile thought they
were making a smart business decision in August 2010 when they each
loaned $250,000 to Today’s Health Care II (“THC”), a Colorado-based
medical marijuana dispensary.1 After all, Colorado’s medical marijuana
industry was second only to California’s at the time, and California’s
medical marijuana industry was estimated at $1.3 billion dollars.2 Both
loan agreements specifically provided that THC would “use the loan
proceeds for a retail medical marijuana sales and growth center.”3 When
THC defaulted on its loan obligations, the two lenders brought suit in
Maricopa County, Arizona Superior Court to enforce their agreement.4
Judge Michael McVey instead dismissed the case, stating that he couldn’t
enforce the agreement where “[t]he explicitly stated purpose of these loan
agreements was to finance the sale and distribution of marijuana. This was
in clear violation of the laws of the United States. As such, th[e] contract
[was] void and unenforceable.”5
The “harsh result”6 of McVey’s ruling sent a worrisome message to
individuals in the marijuana industry: So long as the current treatment of
* Senior Notes Editor, Hastings Business Law Journal, Volume 14; J.D. Candidate 2018,
University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2018; B.A. Philosophy and Religious Studies,
French Language 2014, Bates College.
1. Abellin, $500,000 Medical Marijuana Loan Up In Smoke, ABC NEWS (May 12, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/500000-medical-marijuana-lawsuit-smoke/story?id=16322793 [http://
perma.cc/4PER-ZED3].
2. Id.
3. Hammer v. Today’s Health Care II, No. CV2011-051310, 2012 WL 12874349, *1 (Ariz. Sup.
Ct. Apr. 12, 2012).
4. Abellin, supra note 1; see also Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, Arizona Medical-Pot Ruling May
Reverberate, ARIZONA REPUBLIC (May 9, 2012, 10:06 PM), http://www.pressreader.com/usa/thearizona-republic/20120510/281741266445069 [http://perma.cc/JCU7-VEU6].
5. Hammer, 2012 WL 12874349, at *4.
6. Ibid.
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marijuana under the Federal Controlled Substances Act7 remains in effect,
marijuana dispensaries and those who do business with them will be denied
access to the courts for relief when a deal goes south—state law
notwithstanding.8 To remedy this lawless situation, at least while
legislators sort out the federalism issues, the commercial marijuana
industry should turn to private arbitration for protection.
Hammer and Haile, unfortunately, are not alone. Similar court rulings
have threatened the undoing of state-level marijuana initiatives.9 Yet
public support for legalization has risen dramatically over the past several
decades.10 According to a survey performed by Pew Research Center,
fifty-three percent of Americans supported some form of legalization in
2015.11 When Pew performed the same survey a little over three decades
earlier, only twenty-five percent of Americans supported legalization.12 To
meet the growing demand, an increasing number of states have enacted
legislation permitting medical or recreational marijuana use.13
7. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841–65 (2017). Congress enacted the Federal Controlled Substances Act
(CSA) pursuant to the Nixon Administration’s declared national “war on drugs.” See Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10 (2005). The CSA purports to combat drug abuse, prevent the diversion of drugs
into illicit channels, and eliminate “[t]he illegal importation, manufacture, distribution, and possession
and improper use of controlled substances.” 21 U.S.C. § 801(1)–(6). To these ends, “Congress devised
a closed regulatory system making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any
controlled substance except in a manner authorized by the CSA.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 13.
8. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]his Constitution, and the laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding.” This Clause mandates that state action give way to federal legislation
where a state law conflicts with a valid act of Congress. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824);
see also Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F.Supp.2d 113, 121 (D.D.C. 2001) (“Even though state law may
allow for the prescription or recommendation of medicinal marijuana within its borders, to do so is still
a violation of federal law under the CSA.”).
9. See United States v. Scarmazzo, 554 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1105 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (“The use of
medical marijuana remains unlawful.”); Tracy v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 11-00487LEK-KSC, 2012
WL 928186, at *13 (D. Haw, Mar. 16, 2012) (holding that, on summary judgment motion, Court could
not enforce “Trees, Shrubs, and Other Plants” provision of insurance policy because plaintiff’s
possession and cultivation of marijuana clearly violated federal law); see also Barrios v. County of
Tulare, No. 1:13-CV01665 AWI GSA, 2014 WL 2174746, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 2014) (holding that
plaintiff could not recover damages as a result of the confiscation or destruction of marijuana because
plaintiff had no cognizable property interest in the marijuana); Haeberle v. Lowden, No. 2011-CV-709,
2012 WL 7149098 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Aug. 8, 2012).
10. See Art Swift, For First Time, Americans Favor Legalizing Marijuana, GALLUP (Oct. 22,
2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/165539/first-time-americans-favor-legalizing-marijuana.aspx [https
://perma.cc/J89P-H7KJ] (explaining the growing trend for public support of marijuana usage between
1970 and 2013); see also Majority of Americans Support Legalization of Marijuana — Polls, RT (Apr.
15, 2015, 4:10 PM), http://www.rt.com/usa/249765-majority-americans-marijuana-legalization [https://
perma.cc/VYQ7-WHMK].
11. Majority of Americans Support Legalization of Marijuana, supra note 10.
12. Id.
13. In November 2012, Colorado and Washington became the first states to legalize marijuana for
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Officially, however, marijuana’s legal status is the same as it has been
since 1970 — categorically forbidden and subject to criminal penalties.14
Marijuana is a Schedule I controlled substance under federal law; its
manufacture, distribution, possession, and cultivation are strictly prohibited
pursuant to the Federal Controlled Substances Act.15
The federal government has repeatedly denied attempts to reschedule
marijuana from a Schedule I to a Schedule II drug.16 In 2011, Deputy
Attorney General James M. Cole issued a memorandum to U.S. attorneys
stating that “[p]ersons who are in the business of cultivating, selling, or
distributing marijuana . . . are in violation of the [CSA], regardless of state
law.”17 Two years later, Cole issued a subsequent memorandum signaling
a general shift in drug enforcement tactics toward more selective
prosecution.18
The memo listed eight broadly stated enforcement
recreational use. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, amended by COLO. CONST. amend. LXIV, § 16;
Washington Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, Initiative 502, ch. 3, 2013 Wash. Legis. Serv. 28
(West) (Initiative Measure-Marijuana-Legalization and Regulation); see also Jack Healy, Voters Ease
Marijuana Laws in 2 States, but Legalization Questions Remain, N.Y. TIMES: POLITICS (Nov. 7, 2012),
https://mobile.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/marijuana-laws-eased-in-colorado-and-washington.html
[https://perma.cc/U24T-4CWH]. Both states now treat marijuana similarly to alcohol — subject to
taxes and heavy regulation, but nonetheless legal for adult use — and other states are beginning to
follow their example. COLO. CONST. amend. LXIV; Washington Marijuana Legalization and
Regulation, Initiative 502. In 2014, voters approved similar initiatives to legalize marijuana in
Washington, D.C., Oregon, and Alaska. Josh Barro, D.C., Oregon and Alaska Vote to Legalize
Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/upsho
t/marijuana-on-the-ballot-in-florida-alaska-oregon-and-dc.html [https://perma.cc/E7NY-FSGS]. The
District of Columbia and Oregon have since enacted similar legislation. See State Marijuana Laws
Map, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreation
al.html [https://perma.cc/PEG9-22ME]. To date, twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia have
legalized marijuana for either or both medical or recreational purposes. These states are Alaska,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. See
Ben Gilbert, One in 5 Americans will soon have access to fully legal marijuana, BUSINESS INSIDER:
LAW & ORDER (Nov. 14, 2016, 12:01 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/marijuana-in-america-20of-americans-can-now-access-legal-weed-2016-11 [https://perma.cc/BXJ2-7FJR], for map of marijuana
policy in the United States; see generally Marijuana Policy Project, Map of State Marijuana Laws,
https://www.mpp.org/states/ [https://perma.cc/QTC4-CDDA].
14. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, 812, 841–65 (2012).
15. Congress identifies Schedule I drugs as those with (1) “a high potential for abuse,” (2) “no
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States,” and (3) “a lack of accepted safety for
use of the drug or other substance under medical supervision.” 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1).
16. See Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California Proposition 215, 62
Fed. Reg. 6164 (1997) (setting forth George W. Bush’s stance of strong federal opposition to all
marijuana use, including uses permitted under state law).
17. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., on Guidance Regarding the Ogden
Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use, at 2 (June 29, 2011),
https://www.scribd.com/document/68589215/Cole-Memo-June-2011 [https://perma.cc/A77S-4VCK].
18. Memorandum from James M. Cole. Deputy Att’y Gen., on Guidance Regarding Marijuana
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priorities.19 Outside the listed priorities, the memo expressed a strong
deference to state law.20 That same year, President Obama promised not to
use “Justice Department resources to try to circumvent state laws on th[e]
issue.”21 The President, however, neither purported to reinterpret the CSA
nor ruled out federal enforcement in those states that permit or even abet
illegal activities.
Judicial refusal to convert such executive statements into binding law
leaves individuals like Michele Hammer and Mike Haile at the mercy of
those with whom they do business. For Hammer and Haile, that meant
$500,000 out of pocket. For medical directors of dispensaries, it may mean
nonpayment for services. For landlords leasing to dispensaries, it may
mean fewer options in situations of default. For investors in dispensaries, it
may mean more losses than profits. Unless and until Congress reschedules
marijuana, where state marijuana laws come into conflict with the CSA, the
state laws will be preempted and overruled by federal law.22 Attorneys
representing individuals like Hammer and Haile have not overlooked this
opportunity. Marijuana law blogs frequently feature practitioner posts
exploring possible solutions for the conflict.23 The blogs themselves,
however, attest to the fact that no one solution sought within the existing
framework adequately controls for the varying results of different courts
and different forums.24 This Note proposes that individuals involved in, or
seeking involvement in, the marijuana industry circumnavigate this
Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/305201382913275685746
7.pdf [https://perma.cc/9B7M-HGYR] [hereinafter Cole Memo 2013].
19. Id. These include: Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; preventing revenue
from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; preventing the
diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state law in some form to other states;
preventing state-authorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking
of other illegal drugs or other illegal activity; preventing violence and the use of firearms in the
cultivation and distribution of marijuana; preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other
adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana use; preventing the growing of marijuana
on public lands and the attendant public safety and environmental dangers posed by marijuana
production on public lands; and preventing marijuana possession or use on federal property.
Cole Memo 2013, supra note 18, at 1–2.
20. Id. at 2.
21. The Editorial Board, American Mayors: Let Them Smoke Pot, N.Y. TIMES: THE OPINION
PAGES (June 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/29/opinion/american-mayors-let-them-smok
e-pot.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/R7XP-STJM]; see Cole Memo 2013, supra note 18, at 2 (making
clear that the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) would no longer use valued resources to patrol state
marijuana dealings).
22. See Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA
L. REV. 74, 102–03 (2015).
23. See, e.g., Rebecca Millican, Your Cannabis Contract: Is It Worth the Paper It’s Written On?,
CANNA L. GRP. (Sept. 13, 2015), http://www.cannalawblog.com/your-cannabis-contract-is-it-worth-thepaper-its-written-on [https://perma.cc/5Y2K-QRN4].
24. Millican, supra note 23. Millican’s own blog corroborates this point.
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impasse between the federal and state governments by submitting to
arbitration any dispute arising out of or related to marijuana.
I. WHY ARBITRATION? BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
Arbitration25 is popularly touted as the most efficient, inexpensive,
and definitive method of dispute resolution in the United States.26 The
method has become so prominent27 some critics even contend arbitration is
“the new litigation,” increasingly resembling a parallel judicial system.28
Shortcomings of this system have led to a rise in different forms of
alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”),29 although consensual arbitration
remains a favorite among alternatives. In 2011, the United States Supreme
Court, no less, praised the arbitration process for “allow[ing] efficient,
streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute.”30 The Court
exalted, “the informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing
the cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution.”31 Arbitration,
25. Leading arbitration scholar Thomas Stipanowich remarks that “[a]rbitration is often described
as everything that civil litigation is not.” Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63
IND. L.J. 425, 429 (1988). The American Arbitration Association (AAA) defines arbitration as “ . . . the
submission of a dispute to one or more impartial persons for a final and binding decision, known as an
‘award.’” Using ADR to Resolve Collegiate, Professional, and Sports-Business Disputes, AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Using%20A
DR%20to%20Resolve%20Collegiate%20Professional%20and%20Sport%20Business%20Disputes.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AP9F-VYD4]. “Arbitration is the most traditional form of private dispute resolution.
. . . Arbitration is adjudicatory, as opposed to advisory, because of the fact that the arbitrator (usually a
retired judge or attorney) renders a decision at the end of an arbitration hearing, and that decision is
final and binding, subject only to a very limited court review.” Arbitration Defined, JAMS,
https://www.jamsadr.com/arbitration-defined/ [https://perma.cc/FR2P-45N3].
26. See David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF CORPORATE
DISPUTES: A REPORT ON THE GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPORATIONS (1998), http://digit
alcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=icrpubs (detailing reasons why
companies use arbitration); AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 25 (defining arbitration
as a “time-tested, cost-effective alternative to litigation”); LONDON COURT OF ARBITRATION,
http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/LCIA_Arbitration.aspx [https://perma.cc/6UUS-K5D4]
(ranking the best features of arbitration as including “maximum flexibility for parties . . . ; speed and
efficiency . . . ; means of reducing delays and counteracting delaying tactics”).
27. For example, AT&T acknowledged in a petition for a writ of certiorari that its arbitration
clauses were embedded in “tens (if not hundreds) of millions” of wireless service agreements. Reply
Brief for the Petitioner at 1, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (No. 09-893)
(U.S. May 3, 2010).
28. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 8–9
(2010). Stipanowich drives his point home by defining arbitration as a “wide-ranging surrogate for
civil trial.” Id. at 5.
29. See Peter B. Edelman, Institutionalizing Dispute Resolution Alternatives, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 134,
135–36 (1984); see generally James F. Henry, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Meeting the Legal Needs
of the 1980s, 1 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 113 (1985).
30. AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S. at 344–45.
31. Id. at 345; 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 269 (2009) (internal quotations
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however, is hardly revolutionary. Aggrieved parties turned to arbitration
centuries ago to resolve their disputes.32
The modern era of arbitration began in the 1920s with the passage of a
New York state statute requiring the enforcement of contractual agreements
to arbitrate future disputes.33 Acts of similar import were before a number
of state legislatures when Congress passed federal legislation, modeled
after the New York Act,34 “to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal
to enforce agreements to arbitrate.”35
Enacted in 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act addresses centuries of
judicial hostility to arbitration36 by placing arbitration agreements “upon
the same footing as other contracts.”37 The origins of this “common law
hostility toward arbitration”38 apparently lie in “ancient times” when the
English courts fought “for extension of jurisdiction — all of them being
opposed to anything that would altogether deprive every one of them of
jurisdiction.”39 American courts initially followed English practice,
perhaps just “stand[ing] . . . upon the antiquity of the rule” prohibiting
arbitration clause enforcement, rather than “upon its excellence or

omitted).
32. Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV.
265, 265 (1926) (“[Arbitration] deals neither with a novel nor a radical remedy, but with one founded
upon the experience of centuries.”); Roger S. Haydock & Jennifer D. Henderson, Arbitration and
Judicial Civil Justice: An American Historical Review and a Proposal for a Private/Arbitral and
Public/Judicial Partnership, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 141, 144 (2002) (“The use of arbitration began in
the United States during the colonial period.”); Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, The Revolving Door
of Justice: Arbitration Agreements that Expand Court Review of an Award, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 861, 865 (2004) (stating that arbitration has been used in the United States “almost from the
nation’s founding”).
33. Cohen, supra note 32, at 266. For a review of the New York statute, see Berkovitz v. Arbib
& Houlberg, 230 N.Y. 261 (1921).
34. Cohen, supra note 32, at 266.
35. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985); Cohen, supra note 32, at
265 (“By this Act there is reversed the hoary doctrine that agreements for arbitration are revocable at
will and are unenforceable”); Volt Info. Sci. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (stating that the
“principal purpose” of the FAA is to “ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced
according to their terms”).
36. See Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874) (stating a party “may submit his . . . suit . . . to
an arbitration . . . . [However,] agreements in advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by
law are illegal and void”); see also Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration’s
Finality Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 137 (2002) (commenting that American
courts viewed arbitration as threatening their power).
37. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (quoting H. R. REP. NO. 96, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1924)).
38. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984).
39. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 211 n. 5 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (quoting United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006,
1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1915)).
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reason.”40 The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)41 aims to change this antiarbitration rule42 and “to assure those who desire[] arbitration . . . that their
expectations w[ill] not be undermined by federal judges, . . . by state
courts[,] or [by] legislatures.”43
The key statutory provisions embodying this congressional pursuit
include Section 2,44 which declares that a written provision for arbitration
“in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for revocation of any
contract;”45 Section 3, requiring courts to stay litigation “upon any issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration;”46 and Section 4, which provides a remedy for a party
“aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate
under a written agreement for arbitration.”47 It does so by directing courts
to compel arbitration “upon being satisfied that the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in
issue.”48 Other relevant sections include Section 9, which details the
procedures by which a prevailing party may seek to enforce an arbitral
award,49 and Section 10, which prescribes the procedures by which the
nonprevailing party may seek to vacate an arbitral award.50 These
provisions together reflect a broad “national policy favoring arbitration.”51
Nevertheless, the U.S. judiciary only fully embraced arbitration in the
1980s after subjecting the Act to decades of searching review. Indeed,
early United States Supreme Court decisions evince a high degree of
40. Id.
41. The FAA was originally named the United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883 (1925)
(codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)). For further information on the history of the FAA, see
Haydock, infra note 32, at 148 n.35.
42. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218–22 (1985).
43. Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d. Cir. 1961)
(Lumbard, J., concurring); see Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12
(1967) (the Act was designed “to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not
more so”).
44. References to sections, unless otherwise indicated, are to the FAA. Section 2 is considered
the “primary substantive provision of the Act.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
45. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
46. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
47. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
48. Id.
49. 9 U.S.C. § 9.
50. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(4).
51. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (holding that the FAA preempts state laws
which “require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to
resolve by arbitration”).
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skepticism about the ability of arbitration to adequately enforce a party’s
legal rights.52
In the 1960s and 1970s, however, courts began to reconsider
arbitration as judges called for “a reappraisal of the values of the arbitration
process.”53 In Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., for
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
defeated a party’s attempt to avoid the FAA by applying the federal
framework, rather than local law, to an issue of arbitrability.54 The court
there based its decision on Section 2 of the FAA, stating that the Act
created “a rule of substantive law declaring . . . that federal rather than local
law governs ‘questions of interpretation and construction as well as
questions of validity, revocability[,] and enforceability of arbitration
agreements . . . .’”55 Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court’s order
compelling the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration.56
Similar decisions signaled a shift in federal judicial sanction for those
“engaged in interstate transactions [seeking] an expeditious extra-judicial
process for settling disputes.”57 The Supreme Court validated this choice
for companies in its seminal 1967 Prima Paint decision.58 Taking into
52. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956)
(“Arbitration carries no right to trial by jury . . . . Arbitrators do not have the benefit of judicial
instruction on the law [and] need not give their reasons for their results; the record of their proceedings
is not as complete as it is in a court trial; and judicial review of an award is more limited than judicial
review of a trial”); see also Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435–36 (1953).
53. Warren E. Burger, Keynote Address, Agenda for 2000 A.D.—A Need for Systematic
Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 79, 94 (1976) (addressing the National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (“The Pound Conference”) and recommending
greater use of “the well-developed forms of arbitration” to settle disputes and remarking that “there is
nothing incompatible between efficiency and justice.” Id. at 92.).
54. Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 384 (2d. Cir. 1961). The
Metro case involved a painting subcontract for a housing project in Florida. Id. at 383. The subcontract
contained the arbitration clause at issue. Ibid. Following performance of the subcontract, petitioners
sought to compel arbitration in order to recover expenses incurred for work additional to that required
by the contract. Id. at 384. Respondents refused to arbitrate the claims, and petitioners thereupon
moved for relief under Section 4 of the FAA. Ibid.
55. Metro, 287 F.2d at 385 (quoting Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d
402, 409 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, cert. dismissed pursuant to stipulation, 364 U.S. 801
(1960)).).
56. Metro, 287 F.2d at 385.
57. Id. at 387 (Lumbard, J., concurring).
58. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967) (holding that, as a
matter of federal substantive law, a challenge to the validity of an underlying contract is severable from
a challenge to the validity of an embedded arbitration clause). The contract at issue in Prima Paint,
much as in Metro, contained an arbitration clause requiring the parties to submit any dispute “arising
out of or relating” to their agreement to settlement by arbitration. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 398. A
party to the case alleged that the other had committed fraud in the inducement of the contract, although
not of the arbitration clause in particular, and sought to have the claim of fraud adjudicated in federal
court. Id. at 398–99.
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consideration the legislative history of the Act, the Court there confirmed
that the FAA “is based upon and confined to the incontestable federal
foundations of ‘control over interstate commerce and over admiralty.”59
Thus, a challenge to the validity of a contract as a whole, and not
specifically to the arbitration clause within it, “is for the arbitrators and not
for the courts” to decide.60 The Court determined that such separability is
necessary to ensure that “when selected by the parties to a contract, [the
arbitration procedure] be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction in
the courts.”61
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court issued multiple decisions
expanding the rubric of the FAA. In the 1983 decision Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., the Court emphasized
that the FAA is a “congressional declaration of a liberal policy favoring
arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural
policies to the contrary,” and that “as a matter of federal law, any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration.”62 A year later in Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Court
reiterated that the FAA is applicable in both state and federal courts.63
Further still, the Court there held that the FAA preempts state law — state
courts cannot apply state statutes that invalidate arbitration agreements.64
“[W]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of
claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by
the FAA.”65 In the years since Southland, the Court has consistently
limited the application of challenges under the FAA,66 offering dramatic
59. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924)). In
support of this conclusion, the Court wrote: “Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to conduct
themselves with respect to subject matter over which Congress plainly has power to legislate.” Id. at
405.
60. Id. at 400.
61. Id. at 404.
62. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983) (emphasis
added); Metro, 287 F.2d at 384 (“Irrespective of state court decisions regarding the construction of
arbitration clauses, all such clauses in contracts coming within the scope of the act must be interpreted
in the light of federal decisional law.”).
63. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12, 15–16 (1984); see, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482
U.S. 483, 490 (1987) (finding preempted a state statute which rendered unenforceable private
agreements to arbitrate certain wage collection claims).
64. Southland, 465 U.S. at 15–16.
65. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 533 (2012) (per curiam) (quoting
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011)).
66. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626–27 (1985)
(reversing a First Circuit holding that some public policy issues are so critical that they must be left in
the hands of the courts; ordering that the dispute under review be sent to arbitration; and noting that “we
are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of
arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute
resolution”); Rent-A-Center, West v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 71–72 (2010) (holding that an arbitrator
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affirmations of its contemporary faith in arbitration as an effective
substitute for litigation.
II. BUCKEYE: AN ILLEGAL AGREEMENT IS STILL A BINDING AND
ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT
Particularly significant to the enforcement of arbitration agreements in
the marijuana-industry context, the Court in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.
v. Cardegna held that an arbitration award is valid and enforceable even
where the underlying factual circumstances of the dispute involve illegal
activity.67 In Buckeye, the Court considered whether the rule of
severability adopted in Prima Paint should apply to a contract that might
be intrinsically invalid — due, for example, to illegality.68 The Buckeye
respondents challenged a “Deferred Deposit and Disclosure Agreement”
that allegedly provided for “usurious interest rates” in violation of Florida
lending and consumer-protection laws.69 Respondents argued that these
violations rendered the agreement criminal on its face.70 The petitioner
moved to compel arbitration based on a clause within the agreement
requiring Respondents to resolve “[a]ny claim, dispute, or controversy . . .
arising from or relating to this Agreement . . . by binding arbitration.”71
The trial court denied the motion, holding that a court rather than an
arbitrator should resolve the respondents’ claim that the agreement was
illegal and, therefore, void.72 The appellate court reversed, but the Florida
Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision in turn.73 Florida’s high
court reasoned that enforcing arbitration provisions contained in an
allegedly unlawful contract “could breathe life into a contract that not only
violates state law, but also is criminal in nature.”74 “Florida public policy
and contract law,” the Florida high court concluded, permit “no severable,
or salvageable, parts of a contract found illegal and void under Florida
law.”75
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Buckeye and
may decide a claim that an arbitration agreement is unconscionable); AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 343,
352 (holding that the FAA’s preemptive effect extended even to grounds traditionally thought to exist
“at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,” rendering invalid California’s Discover Bank
rule).
67. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006).
68. Id. at 444–45.
69. Id. at 443.
70. Ibid.
71. Id. at 442 (quoting the FAA).
72. Id.at 442.
73. Ibid.
74. Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860, 862 (2005).
75. Id. at 864.
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reversed the Florida decision, reaffirming its Southland and Prima Paint
holdings.76 Heeding Prima Paint’s rule of severability,77 the Court rejected
the Florida court’s attempt to draw a distinction between void and voidable
contracts.78 The Court recognized that Prima Paint did not discuss whether
the challenge at issue would have rendered the contract in that case void or
voidable.79 Indeed, Prima Paint expressly disclaimed any need to apply
state severability rules to arbitration agreements.80 Likewise in Southland,
the Court did not dwell on whether the several challenges involved there —
“fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and
violation of the California Franchise Investment law” — would have
rendered the contract void or voidable.81
Instead of drawing a distinction between void and voidable contracts,
the Court divided challenges to the validity of arbitration agreements into
two types.82 The first type, the Court explained, specifically challenges the
validity of an agreement to arbitrate.83 The other type of challenge the
Court proffered brings into question the contract as a whole, either on some
ground that directly affects the entire agreement (e.g., the agreement was
fraudulently induced) or on the ground that the illegality of one of the
contract’s provisions renders the whole contract invalid.84 The first type of
challenge prompts a Southland analysis; the second type of challenge, a
Prima Paint analysis. Applying those analyses to the case at bar, the Court
determined that a challenge to the validity of a contract as a whole, and not
specifically to an arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator.85
As applied to a dispute arising out of or relating to a commercial
marijuana transaction, Buckeye provides support for a party to compel
arbitration even where a challenge exists to the validity of the overall
agreement under the CSA. This means that the illegality of part of the
transaction — that part relating to marijuana — does not operate to nullify
an agreement to arbitrate. In this context, Buckeye ensures that, once
parties enter into an agreement containing arbitration provisions, disputes
falling within the scope of parties’ agreement be determined by an
arbitrator rather than a court; this contractual intent must be respected even
76. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006).
77. Id. at 449.
78. Id. at 446 (commenting on the fact that neither Prima Paint nor Southland turned on whether
the challenge at issue would render the contract voidable or void).
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Id. at 444.
83. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1984).
84. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 (2006).
85. Southland, 465 U.S. at 4–5.
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with regard to claims arising under the CSA.
III. ENFORCEMENT: THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
Buckeye and the favorable Supreme Court jurisprudence it relied on
ensure that all courts adhere to a correct interpretation of the FAA and that
marijuana-industry participants have legal recourse. These measures would
be futile if courts could refuse to confirm and enforce an award.
Fortunately, the FAA precludes states from undermining its objectives by
supplying mechanisms for the enforcement of arbitration awards: Parties
may seek out a judicial decree confirming an award, an order vacating an
award, or an order modifying or correcting an award.86 For example,
Section 9 of the FAA provides that “any party to the arbitration may apply
to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon
the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or
corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11.”87 Even where the parties
fail to specify a confirming court, “such application may be made to the
United States court in and for the district within which such award was
made.”88 An application for any of these orders is an action in itself. The
application obviates the usual need for a separate contract action to enforce
or alter an arbitral award in court.89
The Supreme Court’s consistent treatment of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause90 demands that state courts afford a judgment obtained pursuant to
these provisions the same res judicata effect that it would receive had a
court, rather than an arbitrator, issued the judgment.91 Over 225 years ago,
by the Act of 26th May, 1790, Ch. 11, Congress affirmed the constitutional
guaranty embodied in the full faith and credit clause, providing that “the
judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity and effect, in
86. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11.
87. 9 U.S.C. § 9.
88. See id.
89. 9 U.S.C. § 6.
90. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof.”).
91. According to the Court, the purpose of the clause was to replace the international rule of
comity with a constitutional duty of states to honor the laws and judgments of sister states. Estin v.
Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) (noting that the full faith and credit clause “substituted a command for
the earlier principles of comity and thus basically altered the status of the States as independent
sovereigns”); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943) (noting that “the clear
purpose of the full faith and credit clause” was to establish the principal that “a litigation once pursued
to judgment shall be as conclusive as the rights of the parties in every court as in that where the
judgment was rendered”).
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every other court of the United States, which it had in the state where it was
pronounced, and that whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in
such state, and none others, could be pleaed [sic] in any other court in the
United States.”92 As the Court later put it, the effect of this Act brought a
useful end to state-to-state litigation by making “the local doctrines of res
judicata . . . a part of the national jurisprudence.”93 Thus, as early as 1813,
the Court interpreted the Act, for example, as requiring a court in the
District of Columbia to enforce a judgment rendered in New York.94 The
next century was no different — in 1908, a Mississippi court was
compelled to enforce a judgment rendered in Missouri, even though the
Missouri judgment was allegedly based on a misapprehension of
Mississippi law.95 Recent decisions of the Court maintain that the clause
imposes a duty on state courts to give another state court’s judgment the
same effect that the issuing court would give it.96 Judgments of one court
thereby gain “nationwide force” for “claim and issue preclusion (res
judicata) purposes.”97
In the context of the marijuana industry, once an arbitration award is
given the force of a state court judgment, it gains nationwide force — no
matter allegations of the underlying agreement’s purported illegalities.
The cumulative effect of this long legal history should offer members
of the marijuana industry a realistic possibility of legal security and equity.
No more may a party to a contract for marijuana fail to perform under that
contract and escape the consequences. Insofar as the contract incorporates
some agreement to arbitrate, a party may be forced to perform on a contract
to which the party agreed and received a benefit, even where the disputed
contract violates federal law. An arbitrator, unlike a judge in a court of law
or equity, will enforce, revoke, or rescind a contract for marijuana as the
law so requires — no matter marijuana’s status under the CSA.

92. Hampton v. M’Connel, 16 U.S. 234, 235 (1818) (Marshall, J.).
93. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109 (1963).
94. See Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. 481, 484 (1813) (“[T]he constitution contemplated a power in
congress to give a conclusive effect to such judgments.”).
95. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237–38 (1908).
96. V.L. v. E.L. 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1020 (2016) (“[The Full Faith and Credit] Clause requires each
State to recognize and give effect to valid judgments rendered by the courts of its sister States.”);
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 180 (1988) (“[T]he Full Faith and Credit Clause obliges States
only to accord the same force to judgments as would be accorded by the courts of the State in which the
judgment was entered.”); see also Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 525 (1986).
97. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998).
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IV. PROPOSAL: A MODEL ARBITRATION AGREEMENT FOR THE
MARIJUANA INDUSTRY
Under the terms of the FAA and the foregoing Supreme Court
jurisprudence, a party may submit any dispute to arbitration that arises out
of or relates to a commercial-marijuana transaction without fear of the risks
associated with contravening the CSA.98 Beyond the FAA and Supreme
Court jurisprudence, policies propounded by the leading ADR
organization, the American Arbitration Association (AAA), support a
party’s ability to choose an industry-specific arbitrator, the site of the
arbitration, and the law to govern the dispute.99 Such choices further
reduce the uncertainty involved in litigating the same dispute under state
law. Through careful drafting of arbitration terms, then, the marijuana
industry and all involved can find the freedom to seek out fair and equitable
redress within the law.
To illustrate, I suggest, with commentary, the following Model
Arbitration Agreement for the Marijuana Industry:
Any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or relating to
this agreement or the breach, termination, enforcement,
interpretation, legality, issues of public policy or validity thereof,
including the determination of the scope or applicability of this
agreement to arbitrate, shall be determined exclusively by
arbitration in [forum State].
Commentary to provision (1):
This provision implements the guarantee of validity provided by
Section 2 of the FAA.100 This language has been tested by the courts and
held to comport with the liberal policy in favor of arbitration embodied in
the FAA.101 Further, the holdings in Prima Paint, Southland, and Buckeye,
instruct that arbitrability goes before an arbitrator first.102 As such,
commercial-marijuana contracts containing a similar provision should be
98.
99.

See supra Parts I, II & III.
See, e.g., Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION, adr.org/commercial [https://perma.cc/S438-45R8].
100. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
101. See Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 385 (2d. Cir. 1961)
(“The federal policy [is] to construe liberally arbitration clauses.”); see also Lawrence Co. v.
Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 410 (1959) (“[Any] doubts as to the construction of the Act
ought to be resolved in line with its liberal policy of promoting arbitration.”); Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 421 (1967) (“Today, without expressly saying so, the Court
does precisely what the Judge Medina did in Robert Lawrence.”).
102. See supra Parts I & II.
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reviewed and resolved, in the first place, by arbitration.
The arbitration shall be exclusively administered by the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) pursuant to its
Arbitration Rules in effect at the time any party submits a claim to
the AAA.
The AAA Arbitration Rules applicable to the claim(s) are
expressly incorporated herein by reference and form a part of the
arbitration agreement between the parties.
Commentary to provisions (2) and (3):
These provisions designate the organization that will administer the
arbitration and the rules that will govern, as well as incorporate the
designated rules into the contract. These provisions choose the AAA as the
administrating body and source of the rules but, just as well, could choose a
different, industry-specific source.
Parties may wish to apply rules specially adapted to commercialmarijuana disputes. Although marijuana groups have yet to propose special
arbitration rules, examples of industry- and dispute-specific rules can be
found in the AAA’s specially adapted rules for the resolution of
construction industry, consumer, and employment disputes.103
The parties submit and consent to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the state courts in [forum City, State], to compel arbitration, to
confirm an arbitration award or order, or to handle other court
functions exclusively in accordance with the [forum State’s
relevant Arbitration Act].
The parties may seek recognition and enforcement of any
[forum State] state court judgment confirming an arbitration
award or order in any U.S. state court or in any court outside the
United States and its territories.
Commentary to provisions (4) and (5):
103. See, e.g., Construction Industry Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, adr.org/construction [https://perma.cc/8TX7-HWVQ]; Consumer
Arbitration Rules, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, adr.org/consumer [https://perma.cc/8AL4553J]; Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION, adr.org/employment [https://perma.cc/M4V2-2VVQ]. The AAA publishes more
specialized rules, such as those dedicated to domain-name, healthcare, international, wireless-industry,
and Olympic-sport disputes. See AAA Court- and Time-Tested Rules and Procedures, AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, https://www.adr.org/active-rules [https://perma.cc/4HSJ-7VDR].
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These provisions should be adopted to ensure that the prevailing party
has a means of enforcing an arbitration award in a court of law. The
provisions thus reinforce Section 9 of the FAA, which establishes the
jurisdiction and procedure for the confirmation of an arbitration award in
court.104 The Supreme Court’s consistent treatment of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause guarantees enforcement of a valid arbitration award from one
state to the next.105
The parties expressly waive any right of removal to the United
States federal courts, and the parties expressly waive any right to
compel arbitration, to confirm any arbitral award, or seek any aid
or assistance of any kind in the United States federal courts.
Commentary to provision (6):
This provision precludes parties from seeking the protection of the
CSA in a federal court by foreclosing defensive attempts to invoke a right
of removal. Thus, this provision operates as a forum selection clause,
confining the forum to the selected arbitration. By this provision, the
parties functionally waive their right to remove to federal court where a
judge would apply the CSA, thereby voiding the parties’ underlying
contract.
Practitioners have similarly suggested attorneys draft forum selection
clauses requiring that marijuana-related litigation take place only in state
court.106 Pursuant to Section 1441(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code,
a defendant may remove a case originally brought in state court to federal
court in the district where the suit is pending if the claim provides original
jurisdiction in federal courts.107 If the defendant comes from, operates its
principal place of business in, or is incorporated in a state other than that of
the plaintiff, the defendant could strategically invoke removal jurisdiction
as a defensive strategy.108 Once in federal court, a federal judge would
apply the “laws that every U.S. judge swears to uphold”109 — federal law

104. 9 U.S.C. § 9.
105. Id.
106. See Walter W. Heiser, Forum Selection Clauses in Federal Courts: Limitations on
Enforcement After Stewart and Carnival Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REV. 553, 595 (1993).
107. Ibid.
108. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2017) (defining when federal courts have original diversity
jurisdiction). A marijuana-related contract will not likely involve any federal questions on its face, and
thus, removal will not likely be asserted on the basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Brianna
J. Fuller, Note, III. Federal Question Jurisdiction, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1443, 1466–67 (2004) (“A
federal court will only have federal question jurisdiction when a substantial federal question appears on
the face of the plaintiff’s claim.”).
109. In re Arenas, 535 B.R. 845, 854 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2015).
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— leaving the plaintiff without means of redress. Practitioners can
anticipate and preempt this strategy by bargaining for a forum selection
clause that waives both parties’ right to remove.
Unfortunately, this drafting solution is not an absolute solution.
Hammer v. Today’s Health Care II, in which a state court judge enforced
the CSA, suggests that removing to federal court might not always be
necessary to succeed defensively in a marijuana-related suit. 110 Whether in
state or federal court, the odds remain stacked against individuals involved
in commercial marijuana ventures even if such individuals operate their
businesses legally, under state law.
The laws of the state of [forum State], including the [forum
State’s relevant Arbitration Act], shall apply exclusively as the
laws governing this arbitration agreement between the parties,
with the sole exception of the [certain forum State law provisions],
which shall not apply. The parties may, however, choose a
different substantive contract law or other laws to govern the main
contract containing this arbitration agreement. In the event the
parties have included a separate provision in their contract
providing for a state, country, or international law to apply, unless
otherwise expressly agreed upon, such provision shall be
interpreted to import rights and obligations of the parties outside
the arbitration agreement.
Commentary to provision (7):
This choice of law provision allows parties to determine the law
applicable to their contract. Parties should elect to apply laws from states
with legislation legalizing recreational or medical marijuana, or both, to
further avoid conflict with the CSA.
Notwithstanding any agreement by the parties to apply a
different law to the main contract containing this arbitration
agreement, any principles of public policy applied by the
arbitrators shall consist exclusively of the [forum State]’s relevant
public policy, including those specific state statutes.
Commentary to provision (8):
This provision precludes arbitrators from invoking public policy to
render the contract void and unenforceable. Such a provision relies on
110. See Hammer v. Today’s Health Care II, No. CV2011-051310, 2012 WL 12874349 (Ariz. Sup.
Ct. Apr. 12, 2012).
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applicable state principles of public policy, such as those enacted in
Colorado and Oregon, for interpretation.111 For example, under Colorado
state code effective May 2013, “[i]t is the public policy of the state of
Colorado that a contract is not void or voidable as against public policy if it
pertains to lawful activities” related to the state laws legalizing marijuana
distribution and consumption.112 Oregon’s legislature has adopted a similar
act: “No contract shall be unenforceable on the basis that manufacturing,
distributing, dispensing, possessing, or using marijuana is prohibited by
federal law.”113 A party that brings suit under these auspices might come
across a judge willing to overlook the CSA and enforce the parties’
contract according to general contract principles.
An arbitrator exceeds his or her powers by voiding or
refusing to enforce any contracts or arbitration agreements
between the parties based solely on the cannabis-related nature of
the contract.
Commentary to provision (9):
An arbitrator must strictly agree to enforce the terms of the parties’
contract. The United States Supreme Court praises arbitration for this
reason, noting in particular that “[i]t can be specified . . . that the decision
maker be a specialist in the relevant field.”114 At least one practitioner
suggests attorneys openly acknowledge the illegality of their parties’
contract in traditional forums to similarly bind judges.115
Many in the industry are wary of such tactics; should the strategy fail,
the consequences are costly.116 When California’s largest cannabis
company CannaCraft decided to emerge from the “gray market” and “shed
[its] clandestine past,” it faced a loss of $500,000 in cash, $3 million worth
of machinery, and $1.5 million worth of cannabis products after 100
officers and agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration raided its
facilities in June of 2016.117 Only a month earlier, CannaCraft had hosted
nearly 50 lawmakers and regulators from Sacramento to showcase its
111. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-601 (2013); see also Control, Regulation, and Taxation of
Marijuana and Industrial Hemp Act, 2015 Or. Laws ch. 1, § 12.
112. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-601 (2013).
113. Control, Regulation, and Taxation of Marijuana and Industrial Hemp Act, 2015 Or. Laws ch.
1, § 12.
114. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345 (2011).
115. See Rebecca Millican, Crafting a Marijuana Business Contract That Will Stand up in Court,
CANNA L. GRP. (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.cannalawblog.com/crafting-a-marijuana-business-contract
-that-will-stand-up-in-court [https://perma.cc/69GG-X7LF].
116. See Fuller, supra note 108.
117. Ibid.
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compliance efforts and “change people’s image of what a cannabis
company looked like.”118 CannaCraft’s plight explains the industry’s
reluctance to “come out into the open” and acknowledge the illegality of
marijuana-related ventures to traditional adjudicators.119
If one or more provisions of this agreement, including the
arbitration clause, is for any reason held to be unenforceable or
invalid, then such provisions will be deemed severable from the
remaining provisions of this agreement and will in no way affect
the validity or enforceability of such other provisions or the rights
of the parties hereunder.
Commentary to provision (10):
This provision is valid and enforceable pursuant to the holdings in
Prima Paint, Southland, and Buckeye, discussed above.120
In addition, if any provision of this agreement (or portion
thereof, including the arbitration agreement) is determined by a
court to be unenforceable as drafted by virtue of the duration,
scope, extent, character, or legality of any obligation contained
therein, the parties acknowledge that it is their intention that such
provision (or portion thereof) shall be construed in a manner
designed to effectuate the purposes of such provision to the
maximum extent enforceable under applicable law.
In the event the right to arbitrate any dispute, claim, or
controversy arising out of or relating to this agreement is rendered
invalid or unenforceable, the dispute, claim, or controversy arising
out of or relating to this agreement shall be subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the state courts in the [forum City, State], unless
otherwise agreed upon by the parties.
Commentary to provisions (11) and (12):
These provisions reinforce the terms set forth in provision six. That
is, the provisions anticipate that an agreement intended to be enforced in
arbitration, once removed to federal court or subjected to federal law, might
fall prey to the terms of the CSA and doctrines of illegality. Consequently,
these provisions serve as a preventive measure against enforcement of the
118.
119.
120.

Ibid. (quoting Dennis Hunter, a founder of CannaCraft).
Ibid.
See supra Parts I & II.
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CSA in the event the dispute is removed from arbitration to the traditional
court system by directing the litigation to state court.
*

*

*

The combination of these key provisions offers the possibility of legal
stability and regularity to parties involved in the marijuana industry.
Although such protection comes in the form of enforceable contracts and
industry-specific dispute resolution procedures and standards, rather than
public law, the marijuana industry will still be able to achieve the
legitimacy afforded to it by citizens of legalizing states. The parties, bound
by these provisions, will find in arbitration the fair dispute resolution
effectively denied to individuals operating in the current, politically
uncertain climate.
CONCLUSION
Although state support for the legalization of both recreational and
medical marijuana has risen substantially since the passage of California’s
Compassionate Use Act in 1996,121 the federal government remains
adamant about marijuana’s status under the federal Controlled Substances
Act. Incoming administrations may continue to outline a program of
selective enforcement for prosecutors, but members of the judicial branch
are prohibited from joining in such agendas. Judges will continue to
enforce the CSA, at least until Congress legislates otherwise. Thus,
individuals looking to capitalize on the booming commercial marijuana
industry risk being denied access to justice in the U.S. court systems.
Rather than gamble on the government turning a blind eye to objectively
illegal activity, marijuana industry members should contract for effective
dispute resolution by the incorporation of arbitration provisions. The
provisions proposed draw on the success and favorable reception of the
Federal Arbitration Act. For the time being, therefore, the best way for
private parties to approach the impasse between the federal and state
governments is not to actually solve the impasse, but rather to resort to this
favorite among forms of alternative dispute resolution to ensure the success
of the marijuana industry going forward.

121.

Compassionate Use Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 11362.5 (Deering 2017).

